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THE CENTRAL CONUNDRUM: UNLAWFUL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS ARE THE 
ORETICALLY VOID YET FUNCTIONALLY 
VOIDABLE
The decided cases make it clear that an unlawful 
administrative act is no act in law. Lord Reid in Ridge v 
Baldwin [1964] AC 40 said it all:
'Time and again in the cases I have cited it has been stated 
that a decision given without regard to the principles of natural 
justice is void, and that was expressly decided in Wood v Woad 
(1874) LR 9 Ex I 90. I see no reason to doubt these 
authorities'.
In Anisminic Ltd v The Foreign Compensation Commission and 
another [1969] 2 AC 147, the judgment of the House of 
Lords actually depended upon the fact that the unlawful 
administrative decision was a nullity. More recent 
authority' is found in Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783 ,where Lord Lowry said 'the 
basic principle is that an ultra vires enactment, such as a 
byelaw, is void ab intio and of no effect'. Many other cases 
to like effect could be cited. An unlawful administrative 
act is thus undeniably void.
Unfortunately, it is equally clear that an unlawful 
decision is often effective until set aside by a court or 
other competent authority. And, if that unlawful decision 
is not successfully challenged, it will turn out to be as good 
as the most proper decision. The position is summed up 
by the following well known dictum from Lord Radcliffe's 
speech in Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] AC 
736 at 769:
'An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act 
capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on 
its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to 
establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or
otherwise upset, it will remain as effectiveJor its ostensible 
purpose as the most impeccable of orders'.
This is a description of an act, which is voidable, i.e. 
effective until set aside by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Yet, as we have seen, precedent requires that 
unlawful administrative acts are void. Moreover, it is 
contrary to the doctrine of ultra vires. This is because a 
voidable act exists, for a time at least, in law. Thus there 
must exist some power under which it is made. It follows 
that a voidable act is intra tires - yet every unlawful 
administrative act must be ultra vires and void.
The doctrine of ultra vires is vital to modern 
administrative law. It provides the constitutional basis for 
most of judicial review, it justifies the classic approach to 
ouster clauses (the reasoning of Anisminic v Foreign 
Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 depends upon 
the unlawful decision in question being ultra vires and void) 
and it is needed to ensure the availability of collateral 
challenge. For unless the challenged act is void it cannot
o o
be raised collaterally before a court that lacks power to 
quash an unlawful act administrative act, e.g. a 
magistrates' court. And it has recently made clear 
(Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 WLR 639 
(HL)) that the absence of collateral challenge undermines 
the rule of law and has consequences 'too austere and 
indeed too authoritarian to be compatible with the 
traditions of the common law' (Lord Steyn). Persons 
could be sent to gaol for doing an act that was not 
unlawful (I do not wish here to debate the merits of the 
ultras vires doctrine - which has been criticised bv some in 
the recent past). The details of the debate are set out in 
Judicial Renew and the Constitution (Hart, 2000, ed. C F 
Forsyth).
So here is the central conundrum that set me thinking 
about this problem: unlawful administrative acts are
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theoretically void yet functionally voidable. As we have 
seen this conundrum lies near the heart of administrative 
law - both in terms of the constitutional justification for 
our subject and more pragmatically in the need for the 
survival of collateral challenge in order to buttress the rule
o
of law. Theory, if it is to provide a sound basis on which 
administrative law may rest, must resolve this 
conundrum, while practice with such insecure and 
inconsistent theoretical foundations must be suspect.
A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY IS NOT THE 
WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM
The most common way in the past of approaching this 
problem has been to rely upon a 'presumption of validity'. 
For instance, this is what Lord Diplock said in Hoffmann- 
La Roche v Secretary of State Jor Trade and Industry [1975] AC 
295 at 365:
'Unless there is [a successful challenge to the validity of a 
statutory instrument], the validity of the statutory instrument 
and the legality of acts done pursuant to the law declared by it 
are presumed...' (Emphasis added).
But this is an unsatisfactory approach to the problem 
because:
(1) It is contrary to the rule of law in that it allows 
convictions to be founded on illegalities (e.g. ultra vires
o v o
subordinate legislation creating offences is presumed 
valid until set aside by a court of competent 
jurisdiction) - this was understood (and approved!) by 
Lord Woolt in Bugg v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[1993] QB473.
(2) The effect of the presumption is authoritarian in that 
it requires the ordinary citizen (who cannot afford to 
challenge questionable decisions in the courts) to 
accept as gospel everything that comes from 
somebodv in apparent authority cf. Christie v Leachinsky 
[1947] AC 573 at 591 ('Blind unquestioning 
obedience is the law of tyrants and slaves...').
(3) The presumption undermines the ultra vires doctrine. 
The power that supports the validity of the unlawful 
administrative act (until set aside) must come from 
somewhere. Thus there must be implied a general 
warrant of power to officials to make decisions, 
however wrong or gross. There is no such statutory 
power.
(4) It is a blanket approach but there is no reason to 
suppose that a blanket approach is necessary or sound. 
A different response is needed in different 
circumstances.
(5) The displacement of the presumption requires the 
exercise of discretion (by the court) in making an 
appropriate order. But the rule of law should not 
depend upon the exercise of discretion - even by a 
judge.
THE THEORY OF THE SECOND ACTOR: 
RECONCILING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
UNLAWFUL ACTS IN CERTAIN 
CIRCUMSTANCES WITH THE CLASSIC 
PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I had been aware of this conundrum and the great
o
difficulties with the presumption of validity for many years 
but had never got anywhere near resolving them, until the 
time came to write an essay for Sir William Wade's 
Festschrift. I decided, with some trepidation, to tackle this 
most difficult of problems in my essay - which was 
eventually published under the title of ' "The Metaphysic 
of Nullity" - Invalidity, conceptual Reasoning and the Rule 
of Law' at p. 141 of the Festschrift, which was entitled 'The 
Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord - Essays on Public Law in 
Honour of Sir William Wade' (OUP 1998, editors Forsyth 
and Hare). And the theory of the second actor is the 
solution that I reached after much cogitation; it does, to 
my satisfaction, reconcile the effectiveness of unlawful acts 
in certain circumstances with the classic principle of 
administrative law.
The nub of the theory can be expressed in the following 
words from ' "The Metaphysic of Nullity" - Invalidity, 
Conceptual Reasoning and the Rule of Law' at p. 159.
'... unlawful administrative acts are void in law. But they 
clearly exist injact and they often appear to be valid; and those 
unaware of their invalidity may take decisions and act on the 
assumption that these acts are valid. When this happens the 
validity of these later acts depend upon the legal powers of the 
second actor. The crucial issue to be determined is whether the 
second actor has legal power to act validly notwithstanding the 
invalidity ofthejirst act. And it is determined by an anah/sis of 
the law against the background of the Jamiliar proposition that 
an unlawful act is void'.
Although hedged about with jurisprudence and abstract 
analysis in the 'The Metaphysic of Nullity', the theory 
thus described is relatively simple. Unlike I believe all 
other academic approaches to the issue, the theory of the 
second actor turns the focus away from the unlawful act 
and on to the powers of the person who acts believing that 
the first act is valid. All the difficulties attendant upon 
seeking some interim validity within the first act are side 
stepped; and thus the classic principles of administrative 
law are reconciled with the effectiveness, in appropriate 
cases, of acts taken in reliance upon unlawful 
administrative acts.
Perhaps it may be useful to give some examples. Let us 
start with R v Wicks [ 1997] 2 WLR 876. Here the accused 
was charged with breach of a planning 'enforcement
o I o
notice'. He had contested the validity of the notice 
unsuccessfully on appeal to the Secretary of State, but 
sought to raise it again as a defence to the charge. The
o o o
House of Lords held that a true construction of the 
statutory words 'enforcement notice' meant simply a 
notice issued by the local planning authority that was 21
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formally valid, i.e. the substantive validity of the 
'enforcement notice' was not a precondition to the 
success of the prosecution. Here the first act is the making 
of the enforcement notice and the second act is Wick's 
conviction for breach of the notice. Clearly, while the 
enforcement notice had to exist in fact it did not have to 
be legally valid in order for a valid conviction to ensue. 
Thus, here the second actor could act validly 
notwithstanding the invalidity of the first act.
On the other hand, consider Director of Public Prosecutions 
v Head [1959] AC 83. Here the respondent was charged 
with having carnal knowledge of a mental 'defective' 
contrary to section 56(1) (a) of the Mental Deficiency Act 
1913, but the certificate of two doctors certifying that the
' J o
victim was a defective and the Secretary of State's order 
transferring her to an institution were themselves defective. 
That meant that the certificate and orders were void, yet 
their validity was fundamental to the offence. It followed 
that the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and the 
Director of Public Prosecution's appeal to the House of 
Lords was dismissed. Clearly, the validity of die second act 
- the conviction of the accused - depended upon the 
validity of the first act, the victim's certification as a 
defective. In such cases the invalidity of the first act does 
involve the unravelling of later acts, which rely on the first 
act's validity. However, the voidness of the first act does 
not determine whether the second act is valid. That 
depends upon the legal powers of the later actor.
If the theory of die second actor does reconcile the 
effectiveness of unlawful acts in certain circumstances with 
the classic principle of administrative law, the important 
practical question remains: how can one determine when 
the second actor has power to act validly notwithstanding 
the invalidity of the first act? We will return to this 
question, but first I will consider the developments 
subsequent to the publication of 'The Metaphysic of 
Nullity'.
DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE 
PUBLICATION OF 'THE METAPHYSIC OF 
NULLITY'
(1) In Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 WLR 
639 (HL), the theory of the second actor as advanced 
in 'The Metaphysic of Nullity' approved by Lord Steyn 
(Lord Hoffmann concurring). It was not contradicted 
by any of the other law lords and there is nothing in 
their speeches inconsistent with it. I must be very 
grateful for this early recognition of the theory - it 
would doubtless otherwise have languished unseen tor 
many years.
(2) Then in R v Central London County Court, ex parte London 
[1999] 3 WLR 1, the theory of the second actor was 
discussed but neither approved nor disapproved, but 
the analysis of the case is consistent with the theory.
(3) In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans [2000] 
3 WLR 843 (HL), the theory of the second actor was 
not discussed but the outcome of the case is consistent 
\\ith the theory (the case concerned a prisoner whose 
conditional release date had been calculated by the 
prison governor in good faith on the law, as it was then 
understood. But in decisions made while she was 
incarcerated, the Court of Appeal made clear that the 
law had been misunderstood. The result was that the 
prisoner was released 59 days after she should have 
been. The interesting point here is that the first act - 
calculating the date of release - and the second act -
o
holding the applicant until that date - were performed 
by the same person - the prison governor. The 
prisoner-recovered damages showing that in fact the 
validity of the second act did require the validity of the 
first act).
(4) Then Fleming and Robb in [1999] Judicial Review 
248 criticised the theory in terms. The theory was 
'broadly welcomed' but, with respect, misunderstood. 
Fleming and Robb accept that 'if the legality of the 
second actor's actions are in issue.. .the analysis begins 
with an examination of the powers of the second 
actor', but they then go on to say that'.. .the theory [of 
the second actor] suggests that whenever the second 
actor (reasonably) relies on an unlawful administrative 
act, that the reliance will be protected and the second 
actor's actions will be justified' (at 256). But this is not 
the theory of the second actor.
According to the true theory, sometimes the second actor 
will have power to act validly notwithstanding the 
invalidity of the first act (as in A v Wicks) and sometimes he 
will not and the second act too will be invalid (as in DPP v 
Head). Whether the validity of the first act is required for 
the validity of the second depends upon the legal powers 
of the second actor, which have to be determined by the 
court facing this issue.
SOME EXAMPLES OF THE THEORY 
EXPRESSLY DEALT WITH IN STATUTE
Most often, of course, this issue of whether the second 
actor has power to act in the event of the first act being 
invalid is not expressly dealt with in the statute granting 
power to the second actor. But sometimes it is. And there 
are several statutes, which address the issues expressly - 
usually giving express power to the second actor to act 
even if the first act is invalid. Thus the Marriage Act 1949 
provides in s. 48(2):
A marriage solemnised in accordance with the provision of this 
Part of this Act [second act] in a registered building which has 
not been certified as required by law as a place of religious 
worship [first act] shall be as valid as if the building had been 
so certified'.
And in section 49 (d) the same Act provides:
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'If any persons knowingly and wilfully intermarry under the 
provisions of this Part of this Act [second act]... on the 
authority of a certificate [first act] which is void by virtue of 
subsection (2) of section thirty-three of this Act [limiting the 
period of validity of a certificatej.... the marriage shall be 
void'.
It is interesting to note that all the examples that I have 
thus far found deal with ensuring that the second actor has 
power to act notwithstanding the invalidity of the first act.
THE WAY FORWARD
Where the powers of the second actor are not expressly 
delimited it is necessary to develop principles to guide the 
courts in deciding that issue as called for by Fleming and
Robb in the following passage:or o
'The important question is: In what circumstances can the step 
from reliance [on the validity of the first act] as a matter oj 
fact to reliance creating lawful justification be taken? In other 
words, in what circumstances is it right to give greater weight to 
the principle of legal certainty than to the principle that the state 
is subject to the law. It is neither inevitable nor necessary that 
the fact of reliance should create a legal power. ... in each case 
specific reasons [why the second act is valid] need to be 
adduced within a framework of principles. The criteria to be 
applied should be consistent with those applied by the courts in 
criminal collateral challenge cases, as the underlying principles 
are the same. The court ought to start the analysis with a strong 
bias in favour of keeping the state within the law... There is 
always a danger that the protection of legal certainty may slip 
into the protection of administrative convenience'.
A start has already been made by the Lord Chancellor, 
who in his speech in Boddington said that a restriction on 
the availability of collateral challenge (i.e. second act 
having power to act not withstanding the invalidity of the 
first act) would be the more readily inferred wrhere the 
challenge precluded was to:
'... administrative acts specifically directed at the defendants, 
where there had been clear and ample opportunity provided by 
the scheme of the relevant legislation for those defendants to 
challenge the legality of those acts, before being charged with an 
offence. By contract, where subordinate legislation ... is 
promulgated which is of a general character... the first time an 
individual may be affected by that legislation is when he is 
charged with an offence under it... In my judgment in such a 
case the strong presumption must be that Parliament did not 
intend to deprive the accused of an opportunity to defend himself 
in the criminal proceedings'.
Two further such principles may be proposed: first, 
where human rights would be infringed upon were the act 
of a second actor to be unexpectedly invalid, then a court 
may readily infer that the second actor has that power to 
act validly in the circumstances. The same principle must 
work the other way round. Where an act of the second act 
would infringe upon human rights if it were unexpectedly
valid, this may justify an inference that the second actor 
lacked in those circumstances the power to act. This it 
seems to me flows readily from section 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.
Secondly, where it is plain from the relevant legislation 
that the first act is intended to be relied upon by second 
actors and that there would be substantial injustice and 
administrative inconvenience if those second acts were 
afterwards found to be void because of the invalidity of the 
first act, then the court might infer an intent that the
' o
second actor could act validly notwithstanding the 
invalidity of the first act (N.B. I am not suggesting a 
balancing of 'legal certainty' and 'legality' on a case-by-
o o j o J J
case basis, but a general principle relevant to the 
interpretation of the statutes involved).
I am conscious as I conclude that these suggestions foroo
the way forward are not as concrete as I would like. But, 
as the decided cases provide the anvil upon which the 
details will be beaten out the position might clarify and 
more precise principles will emerge. What I am sure about 
though, is that it is only the theory of the second actor's 
change of focus that allows such principles to be 
developed and takes this issue of the effectiveness of void 
acts away from the vagaries of discretion and into the 
realms of law. ®
Dr Christopher Forsyth
Reader in Public Law, University of Cambridge
This article is taken from a seminar given at IALS on 8 March
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